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THE LAST 48 DAYS OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE
By PAUL.FRANC;0IS CARCOPINO
'The events friF/Ii l\·iFvembe.. 7 to December 24 of last year cost Frallce he.. cololl iul
rllll,il'e in Africa ami reduced the l/1'ea under the COlltrol of the Prellch OO'vt>rnmenl
to till' 811l1l11c<Jt 8ize in ,nany celltllrie8. At Ihe lime when these e"ellts look place,
'reports were 80 sw,nly ami conl"adictory that ,:t was impos8ible to form an iden, abol/I
Iheir srquence. Since th6,.,. however, 1>"lt,h a<lditiona[ information has be611 pllbl-i~he<l,
;lIcl"diIlU lengthy oiJicial CiFm'lll1.miquf.8 of Ihe French Government.
011 Ihe blls'i" of allmateri"lllt'O·ilable ill Shang/wi, M'r. Om'copillo, the Frellch
''''''lOr of "Frnnce [Im[er the Armisticc" ("1'he XXlh Ce'lIury," .July 1942), pre8e'jl.~
Ihc C"Cllls of tho"e histo.,,:c doy" as they appcar to h'/t'e taken 1'[',cc.-/\. ..'I.
A LL through the sUlllmer of 1\)42therc were rumors of an impendingAnglo-American attack on French
Africa. On October :!l, Admiml Darlnn,
commander in chid of tho French armed
force~, was Ront by Marshal P6tnin to
Africa, to inspect conditions there and
the readiness of the ArlllY and Navy to
meet. tLlly umergp.ncy. The Admiral madc
a. nnmbcr of strong declarations about
the determination of the French Covern-
ment to defend its African empire. Thus,
on October 26, he said in Rabat (Moroc-
co): "Should a direct threat bccome
evident for 'Vest Mrica, we are in a
position to react promptly. Although I
knew this before starting my trip, 1 have
now convinced myself with my own eyes."
On November 7, Dal'lan was in the
eit~· of Algiers.
KOVEMBBR 8
DUl'ing the night of November 7/8, the
Anglo-American invH-sion of French North
Africa began. We are not concerned
here with the military course of events,
which was described in the January issue
of this magazine. France lost her colonial
empire, not as a result of any Anglo-
American victories, but because of trea-
son bv her own citizens, and it is their
attitu~le that we shall trace here.
In Rabat, a pro-Allied uprising coin-
cided with the start of the invasion. Its
leader, General Bethollard, and the otber
conspirators had been in touch with
Rriti.,h agents who arri \'ed :L few days
earlier in a submarinc. The ro\·olt was
quickly suppressed by Ceneml Nogucs,
the Resident General of Morocco, and
(Jenora I Bethouard was arrested.
In the city of Algiers, contmr,)' to the
first news, it seem that bf'tter organized
find more numerous dissidents under
General Mast, the deputy commander of
the French forces, were able from the
beginning to take o\~or aU essential puulic
buildings and utilit,ie:-, while American
detachments landed in the neighborhood.
After that, resista.nce in Algiers was di:-·
organized and weak and the situation
extremely confused. By 10 p.m. that
same night, at the very latest, American
troops were in control of the city.
Apart from Algiers, the French military
machine automatically went into action
against the invasion and offered brave
resistance. The troops loyally followed
the command of Marshal Petain which
he had sent out at 8.30 a.m. on November
8 and which ended with the clear order:
"France and her honor are at Rtake.
We are attacked and we shall ddend
oursolves. That is the order I give."
In the afternoon Jacques Doriot, the
leader of the People's Party in Paris,
said from the balcony of the Party
Building:
'Ve are convinl'ed t hat we would be stronger
today if we had severed relat ions completely with
llritain two ycurti ago, lind if we had arn·titcu
numerous American spics and had concluded an
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allianct\ with Gennanr. I know there are men in
the Government who think .. we do. But. there
""' also thollO in power who t.hink opposite, and
these men must. be driven out of the Government
immediately. Some of us have not been afra.id to
fight again!lt the Soviet Union in icy steppes. We
are now read)' to fight in the bot deeert 88 Well!.
That same evening Admind Darlan
ent a telegram to Vichy. The contents
of this telegram have not been made
public. However, to use the words of
the official French communique of De-
cember 6, "it allowed one to anticipate
the future surrender of Algiers." Ap-
parently it included Darlan's suggestion
to conclude a local o,l·mistice. (Vichy,
however, did not know whether the tele-
gram was genuine nor whether Admiral
Darlan WB.<i still free.) During the night
the second telegram arrived from Admiral
Darlan informing the French Government
that he was considering t.he possibility
of opening negotiations.
BETWEEY VICHY AXD .u.GIERS
On )It.ndlly the 9th, at 8 a.m., the
)larshnl. in {l,nswering the c.ables he had
received during the night, categorically
forbade Darlan to open any negotiations.
He also informed him that Laval was 011
his way to Munich to meet Chancellor
Hitler. But when shortly afterwards the
news of the Algiers armistice reached
Vichy, the Marshal had to conclude that
Admiral Darlan was either not willing
r not able to obey his instructions.
Without further delay the Marshal an-
nounced: "1n the a,bsence of Admiral
Darlan. I have ta.ken o,,<~r from today the
i"upreme ('olllllland of the land, air' and
nn"a1 forces."
One mol'o import.ant, decision was made
by thc )fnl'shal on November n. After
a Illcctillg which In''ted one hour, the
French )lini t.erial Coullcil issued an an-
nOUJlcementat ';.15 p.lII. to t he effect
t hat the l S Government. by ex pamling
the WUI' to North Africa. had ..cvered
diplomatic relations with France.
To "j hy and to the world in general
the i"ituntion in AlgieI'. rt'mained extreme-
ly confustd. The )farshal received a
new tcl<'gram from Dnrlan in which he
ilugge.sted st.cps against U number of high
officer. for their treacherous attitude the
day before. (These officers were later
actually deprived of their French na-
tionality by Vichy.) From this the Mar-
shal should have assumed that the
Admiral W88 still loyal to him. But,
very early on the morning of the 10th,
two telegrams arrived from Darlan in
quick succession. In the first one the
Admiral proposed a plan for negotiations
with the American authorities. In the
second. without waiting for a refusal
from Vichy, he informed the Government
that he had decided to treat with the
Anglo-Americans and, moreover, that he
had issued the order to cease fire.
Again the answer of the Marshal was
categorical: "I have ordered resistance,
and I maintain this order." But 88 far
as Darlan was concerned these words
had no effect, for he now informed Vichy
that he had handed himself over 88 a
prisoner to the Anglo-American. In the
Marshal's eyes this meant the end of
Darlan, and he immediately appointed
General Nogues as the Government's
only delegate to command the troops in
French North Africa.
THE REST UF' FRE:-;CH AFRICA
Meanwhjlt', reasi'llring mes,'lage::: had
arrived from other parts of the Empire.
General NoguCs, who was cOllduct.ing
the operations in Morocco, assured the
Marshal of his own loyalty as well as that
of his troops and the native population
Imder him. At the same.time the COy-
ernor General of Algiers, M. Chatel, issued'
from Vichy a proclamation to the people
of Algiers which included the following
wordR:
In IO~'lll obedience to our Chief. MIII'!lIIUI Petain,
you will do your dUly ....ithout fear of IUIY !ltu'rifiOOll
in d{'fending our ('ounlry and mointftining France'.
honor. May God ble88 you and grant vi tor)' to
our nrruies !
Boisson, Governor General of French
WCFlt Africa, cabled: "Marshal Petain
and the Government can count 011 liS.
\\'e are ready." And General Ba.rre,
commander in' chjef of the F'rench forces
in Tunisia, added: "Our soldierl.,· duty
is dear and simple: We must follow the
order of the Marshal." (All these men
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The Allied Invasion of North Africa in November 19'2
were to betmy the Mat'shal a few days
later.)
To Vichy it must have seemed by the
eyening of November 10 that, with the
exception of Algiers, the French forces
and French administration in Africa had
remained loyal and were continuing their
resistance against the invaders. How-
ever, it W/l,S also clear-not only to the
Marshal but abo to Chancellor Hitler-
that the resistance was most ineffecti Ye,
and that it was only a question of hours
before Morocco and Algiers would be in
the hands of the British and Americans.
THE DEFENSE OF UNOCCUPIED FRAXC.E
On tho morning of November 11 the
French radio broadcast a lett{lr from the
Fiiluer to Marshal petain. In it, the
];'tihrer pointed out that the armistice
agreement of 1940 between Germany and
France had been based on the assumption
t.hat the armistice would be not merely
It passing episode but constitute the
actual cessation of the war and that the
armistice agreement should in no cir-
cumstances result in a dcterioration of
Germany's military situation owing to
its lenient terms. The Anglo-American
attack on French North Africa and the
threat to the unoccupied coast of southern
France had, the Fiihnw stated, nullified
the conditions of the armistice. He con-
tinued :
1 havo t.o infol'll) yuu. mur:h t.O my rogrot, thnt·,
in ngroolllont with the Italian GO\'ernrnent, J soo
lII~'self eompellerl to send my troops by the quiek.
o>;t way through Fran<:'"ll to occupy tho 1Il0diter·
ralleHn COURt in oruer t.o ward off a possible enem)'
at<snult.; se<;ondly, to take o\"er t,he protection of
COI'si"" ngaulHI. IL menacillg alt.ack by Anglo.
Amcricun forces.
I wish to state in advance that nl\' uetion is not
directed ugainst. you as Chief of th; French Stnte
and venerut.ed leader of the bra\'o :FJ'on"h lloldiors
of t,ho World War, nor agaiU8t the French Govern·
ment, nor against Frenchmen who desire peace
and wish to prevent their country from becoming
onco ugain a' theater of war.
rn this connection, I should also liko to assure
you that the ontry of Axis troops into ulloccupied
France is DOt directed against tho French anne<!
forces, but that I still entertain the hope of being
ublo some uay to defend, togother with them,
Europe and Europe"s African possession.~ against
tho predatory Anglo,Saxon coalition.
Finally, this march int.o :FraDco is not directed
ngaill!!t the French ndministration, which I hope,
will eontinue to fulfill its duties ns hitherto.
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The sole aim of this Gennan action is to prevent
<>n the C088t of southem France a repetition of what
took place in North Africa.
Meanwhile, the German troops had
crossed the demarcation line between oc-
cupied and unoccupied France and were
rushing through southern France at full
speed and without meeting any resistance.
A few hours late1', the entire coast was
firmly in German hands, and the con-
struction of new fortifications began im-
mediately. Only the naval port of Toulon
was excepted from occupation.
In the face of this German emergency
step, the Marshal sent the following
message to the }I'rench nation :
People of France and of the Empire! I thought
that I had already lived through the darkest
llOUrH of my liIe. However, the events which
are taking place today remind me of the daya of
June 1940. NevertheleB8, we must remain calm.
In the absence of Admiral Fran~is Darlan, who
is in Algiers, I have assumed command over the
French armed forces. I salute with grief all those
soldiers. sailol'A, aviators, and ci"ilians who are
falling for the defense of our country I\!IU our
honor. Frenchmen, have confidence in your
l\larshlll, who thinks only of France.
FRIDAY THE TlllRTEt:NTH
The 12th brought a new telegram
from Admiral Darlan in which he in-
formed Vichy that he had recovered his
freedom, that he had taken over the
command of French North Africa, and
that he was negotiating with the American
authorities.
By now Vichy had received a con-
sililerable number of telegrams from Dar-
lan, but it had been impoBBible to know
for sure whether the Admiral had actually
sent them and if so, whether he had
done it of his own free will. As a result,
Vichy had continued to doubt the au-
thenticity of these messages and refused
to believe in Darlan's treason.
But Friday the 13th, indeed a black
day for France, furnished the Marshal
with a sad solution to the riddle. On
that day, the Admiral made a speech
over the radio in Algiers. His voice
couId be easily recognized, and there
was now no doubt left regarding his per-
sonal stand. On the following day, one
week after the sta.rt of the invasion, the
Marshal disavowed the Admiral by tele-
gram. This action was la.ter followed up
by the revocation of the Admiral's French
citizenship.
Perhaps it will never become quite
clear what had been the thoughts in the
mind of Admiral Darlan during that
past week. However, considering the
sequence of events which we have just
described and considering the ambitious
character of the Admiral, one might try
to reconstruct his ideas.
THE RIDDLE OF DARLAN
'Vhen France collapaed in the summer
of 1940, Darlan was commander in chief
of the French fleet, and the French fleet
was the only factor of power left to
France. This automatically and without
any particular political merit on his part
made the Admiral one of the most im-
portant figures in France. Petain, de-
prived of all other instruments of strength,
leaned on the Admiral, making him
Minister of Navy in successive govern-
ments, later giving him more offices,
including those of Minister for Interior
and Foreign Affairs, and even, in Feb-
ruary 1941, designating him his sucOO68Or.
Admiral Darlan, the great-grandson of a
man who had died fighting the English
at Trafalgar, disliked the British intense-
ly, and in his speeches he did not conceal
what he thought of France's ex-allies who
murdered Frenchmen in their treacherous
attacks on Oran and Dakar. At the
same time he declared his gratitude for
the lenienoy shown by Germany toward
France, his sympathy for a new order
in Europe, and his loyalty toward the
stipulations of the armistice and partic-
ularly toward the Marshal.
While there was no chance and no
desire on the part of the British to win
over Darlan, it was different with the
Americans. Petain, an upright soldier,
did not see through the machinations for
which the continuation of diplomatic re-
lations gave the Americans a chance.
The American Ambassador Admiral Leahy,
and in particular the counsellor of his
EmbaBBy, Mr. Murphy, (later Consul
General in Algiers) worked tirelessly for
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dissension among the French. They
stressed the traditional Franco-American
friendship and exploited the anxiety
which the French felt for their poesesaions
in the Western Hemisphere. It is quite
possible that Darlan fell prey to their
efforts. Perha.ps the Marshal no longer
felt wholly sure of the Admiral, for in
April 1942 he made Laval Chief of the
Government, thus depriving Darlall of
most of his political power.
DARLAN'8 DOUBLE GAME
Whell he was ill Algiers on November
7, did Darlan know that the Anglo-
Americall invasion was to start that
night? So far we are not able to answer
this question with certainty. But we
have 8 fairly good idea of what happened,
once t.he invasion had begun. It seems
that Darlan was immediately arrested
(perhaps only for show) alld freed after
he had given orders to cease fire and had
declared his willingness to co-operate with
General Eisenhower.
During t,he first few hours, as long as
the position of the Marshal W88 not
clear, Darlo.n could try to fool himself
t.hat his actions would perhaps be ap-
proved in Vichy. But Darlan did not
have to wait long for a clarification of
t,he Marshal's position. It came at 8.30
a.m. on November 8 with the Marshal's
strict order for resistance. Now there
was only one thing for Darlan to do:
prbve his loyalty to the MaJ'8ho.l, obey
his orders t.o fight the in.aders and, if
this was impossible, become a prisoner
in the American camp. Instead, the
Admiral played a crooked ga.me. He
tried to deceive the Marshal in numerous
t.elegrame, giving him an entirely false
picture of the situation and of his own
actiOllS, while all the time he was co-
operating with the American invaders.
When the German armies occupied
southern Franoo, Darlan may have played
with the idea that the Marshal would
declare himself a prisoner of the Germans.
In that case Darlan, the dHignated
successor of the Marllhal, would automat-
ically have bct'll ve.sted with the Mar-
shal's powers.
II these were the Admiral's ideas, his-
error was based on a profound misjudg-
ment of the Marshal. He should have-
known that, to a man like Petain, nothing
would be left but t.o disavow any man,
even Darlan, if he disobeyed. Petain
himself made this quite clear when he-
said in a message to all Frenchmen :
Admiral Darlan dartl8 to declare that I am not
able to make known my real thought. to the-
}'renoh people. and he pretends to act in my name.
I am not the man to surrender to coercion. To
inainuate the contra!')' ill to inault me. (No\'embt'r
16.)
It is not often that men who, like.
Darlan, are trained throughout their lives
to obey are at the same time statesmen
of vision. From the moment when, fOl"
the first time, the Admiral had wavered
from the clear path of obedience in dis-
regarding the Marshal's order of Xo-
vember 8, he was to pass through a laby-
rinth of zigzags and delusions which
eventually were to end in blood.
Until Nove,mber 14 the Admiral might
have consoled himself with the idea that
perhaps there was some kind of t,reason
which W&8 not really treason. After the-
Marshal's disavowal on that day, his
position &8 a t,raitor became ob\'ious to
himself and to all the world. HiR policy
became that of 0..0 adventurer. He W88
soon to find out what his masters thought
of him. Only a few days later Vernon
Bartlett called him "an extremely useful
instrument. " •
THE FLEET STILL LEFT
By now the fight between the }"'rellch
forces and the invaders had ceased com-
pletely and, with the exception of Tunisia,
French West Africa and French Soma.li·
land, the African empire of France was
in the hands of Roosevelt and Churchill.
But there was still the French fle('t at
Toulon. On November 15, Admiral
Laborde, the commander of the French
naval foroos in Toulon, published an
order in which he said :
We owe this Itate of affairs [of not being oC'
cupiedl solely to a fooling of ftdmiration ",hich
t,he heroio attitude of our comrades of the Second
Light Naval Squadron in Algeria and Morocco,
who remained loyal to their oath unto death, stirred
in the hearts of high ."xis milit.ery authoritios.
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Theso 1\111 horil i<' lu t night re'l"l'llloJ Aumiral
:Marquis lUld myllt'll to pledge our word of honor
to this f.'ffcct. It now dept'Jlds on you whether
this 8Ul.te of affnirs can be maintnined. I am
guarantor of ~'our obedience t,owards :\Iarshal
Patain, whom I lin", toda)' and who instructed me
to teU )'OU t,hat he is counting on you to save t,he
tuuty ami honor of France. I take it for granted
that none of you ,,,ill be so uJlliCnlpulous as to
forget this duty.
TIlE C.~SE OF GIRAUD
Once t.re&! on had ta.ken place a t the
t,op in t.he person of Admiral Da,rlan, it
F:pread rapidly throughout Frenoh Africa.
But so strong was the prestige of the
Marshal that most of the traitors were
for(~ed to pretend that they were acting
with the Marsha.I's consent. The first
to do this after Darlan was General
Giraud.
Geneml Gira,ud, who lu1,(.1 been taken
prisoner of wur in 1940 by the advancing
German Rl'luies, had been allowed con-
F:iderable ft'codom of mO\'ement in Ger-
many after he had given his word of
honor not tet nCl', He hroko his word
and tied t,u unoccupied France. (:er-
many did not insist on hi,; return, but
the Marshal was worried t.hat the General's
attitude might harm Franco-Gernu\n re-
lations. He had a serious talk with
Cirautl and received from him a letter,
written on May 4, 1942, in which the
(;e'1eral assured him of his loya.lty. The
let.tf"r ended :
I gi"e you my word of honor lUI an olUC('r that
I will wldcrtaxe nothing whotsocyer that might
disturb our relations with the Gennan Govcrnment,
or hinder tho work which you, Admiral Dorian,
find President Laval have to fulfiH. My past is a
guarnnl('o for my Ilincerity, and I o8k you, ?l10nsieur
Ie l\Illrecl IIII, to Ilccept the 88811f1UlCe of my full
8ttachment.
Gimud broke t.his word of honor t.oo
and j leaving France apparently aboard a
foreign submarine, appeared in North
.-\frica, alleging that he had been invested
by t.he Marshal with the command of the
French troops t.here. Tho Marshal re-
fut.ed t.his lie in his message of Novcm bel'
16 by declaring that the Ueneral had
forfeited his honor, adding: "r cate-
gorically forbid General (:iml1d to use
Illy na,me and to allege t.hat. he is acting
on my nehaU." Incidentally, froUl the
moment Giraud arrived in ~orth Africa,
rivah'v arose between him and Darlan,
Whet.her this was real or only simulated
in order to deceive the Marshal, is hard
to tell. At any rate it was used by
Darlan as au excuse for disregarding
t.he Marshal's orders, for he c1ainled that
he was trying to prevent Giraud from
usurping command of the t.roops.
UV..\L
On Xovember Ii, a cabinet meeting
under the presidency of t.he Marshal was
held in Vichy. In it the Marshal, to
quote the communique of November 19,
"decided to confer upon Premier Laval
power. reqnired for enabling the Chief of
the (~o\'ernment [Lava,)] to take mess-
ur('.g nccc itated by the present diffi-
culties of France." Thercupon ('<>nstitu-
tional Act No. <I concerning t,he succes-
sion to the post of Chief of State was
changed. Laval, it was decided, would
be entrusted with the task of deputizing
for the Chief of State in case the latter
were, prevented from carrying out his
duty. Laval thus beca,me, in place of
Darlan. the designated uecessor of the
)larshal.
Dm'ing tho following days a few more
attempt,s were made by Vichy to restore
t,he fighting morale of tho French forces
in North Africa. On Novomber 19 at
8.30 p.m. the Marshal i sued a new order
branding the trait·ors for being in the
uervice of a. foreign power and for refusing
to obey his orders. "Once more I order
you to resist Anglo-American aggression,"
he continued. Two days later, again at
8.30 p.m., Layal made a speech over the
radio outlining his position and policy
and asking for the support of the Marshal
by the French people. "Do not forget,"
he exclaimed, "that throughout history
emigrc& have always b(,,(,ll wrong." But
it was of no avail.
THE COLLAYSE
Mellnwhile, Boisson, the Governor Gen-
eral of French 'Vest Africa, had estab-
Ii hed contaet with Darlan, yet remained
in t.ouch with Vichy. Through the media-
t.ion of Darlan he negot.iated an agreement
with the Americans in ('omplete disregard
of the Mllrshal's express order to resist
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all aggression. On November 23 he put
himself under Darlan's orders and an-
nounced on November 24 that he had
signed an agreement with the Americans
which, he claimed, excluded any occupa-
tion, either foreign or de Gaullist, of
French West Africa, a olaim which was
immediately belied by facts.
I t was in this connection that the
world became aware for the first time of
a rift between the factions of Darlan and
de Gaulle: it became known that Gen-
<lral Barreau, the commander in chief of
the forces in French West Africa, instead
of following the step taken by Governor
General Boisson in placing himself under
Darlan, had gone over with his t.roops to
Geneml Charles de Gaulle.
A few days later, French Somaliland
was occupicd by British and de Gaullist
forces. The only leader who remained
loyal to tho Marshal was Admiral Esteva,
the Resident General of Tunisia, whose
sailors held Bizerta until German and
It.alian forces arrived. Those sailors later
ret urnee I triumphantly to France via
Ital) . Today Tunisia is the only African
possession still under Vichy administra-
tion.
FinalJy, treaaon caused Fl'anoo to lose
her last trump card in the political game
-of the powers-her fleet. When the
Germans became aware of what was
going on in Toulon they ordered the oc-
cupation of the port during the night
November 26/27, Thereupon the French
fleet scuttled itself.
QU.-\RRELS AXD l'ACTlONS
)leanwhile, Darlan proceeded on his
path of adventure. On November 30 he
proclaimed himself "High Commissioner
for North Africa," still olaiming that he
was doing this by virtue of the powers
-conferred upon him by the Marshal, and
.declared that the Resident General of
Morocco wna under him. General Nogues
,agreed and was la,ter deprived of his
citizen hip by Vichy. This nlso happened
to the Governor General of Algiers,
Cha,tel, who meanwlillo had returned to
_J\lgiers llnd joined Dnrlan's camp. On
December 2 an "Empire Council" met
upon Darlan's initiative and under his
presidency at Algiers. This Council in-
cluded NoguCs, Boi880n, Chatel, and later
Giraud, and was given the appearance of
a regular government. Two days later
the Admiral declared himself "Chief of
the French State in North Africa." The
protest which this immediately evoked
from General de Gaulle showed more
clearly than ever the growing rift in the
camp of the rebels. When de Gaulle
saw himself deprived of the BBC micro-
phone over which he wanted to proteBt
against Dal'lan's usurpation of power, he
appointed Goneral Catroux &8 commander
in chief of the French forces in Africa.
During all this time the Marshal had
followed the one policy which he con-
sidered right, and on December 5 he
answered the Fiihrer'sletter of November
27 by assuring him of the French Govern-
ment's firm determination to "pursue a
policy which wi,ll secure France's future
in the reorganized Europe" and stating
his belief that "a historical entente be-
tween our people should not be impos-
sible."
The events in France and North Africa.
were now proceeding along entirely dif-
ferent lines. While metropolitan'France,
under the leadership of pet.ain and Laval,
co-operated with Germany, and while
German and Italian forces rapidly oc-
cupied a large part of Tunisia, welcomed
particularly by Tunisia's large Italian
population, the rest of French North
Africa offered a picture of unrest and
deep-rooted discord. Soon there were at
least four factions, There were the Brit-
ish with their puppet, General de Gaulle,
who claimed that the latter should head
the French in North Africa and every-
where else. (But even de Gaulle and
the British did not see eye to eye.)
There were the Americans, who dis-
trusted de Gaulle as a tool of the British
but who were not quite sure what they
should do, and who were playing along
with Darlan. There was Darlan, who
co-operated with the Americans but who
had personal ambitions, and there was
General Giraud with his hopes of cmerg-
THE I.AST 48 DAYB OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE
by restoring to the Jews their French
nationality awL their former privileges.
The first period of the African adven-
ture came to a close when Admiral Dar-
lan, perhaps the ablest man of all and
deeply hated by the British, was mur-
dered by one of their tools on Christmas
Eve. When the curtain went down over
the bloody BOOne of his 888888ination, &
chapter in French history had come to &
close. Although the quarrels continue
and confusion still reigns, hampering the
activity of the Allies, it is Washington
and London. who now rule over the
French Colonial Empire.
Do the French not understand that,
after the military defeat of 1940 and the
moral defeat of 1942, it is no longer
enough t() wait passively and rely on the
Germans t() do the fighting for theml
Do they not realize that it has become
necessary to join the Germans in. the
struggle for the defense of European
civilization and the restoration of the
French Empire ~
•••
ing as a compromise between de Gaulle
and Darlan. Even Moecow, in simul-
taneous di'mll,rchu made by the Soviet
Ambassador in London and Washington
()n December 10, made it clear that it
had its own ideas about North Africa,
where, incidentally, many Red Spaniards
had Jived under arrest by the French
authorities.
The man who seems to have foreseen
more clearly than anyone else the mess
that North Africa was likely to become,
was Winston Churchill. From the very
beginning he rid himself of l'68ponsibilit)·
by his declaration of November 11 that
in the North African aftair he was only
Ro<>seve1t's "active and ardent lieu-
tenant."
Indeed. Roosevelt made himself quite
8 t home in French North Africa.
Through General Eisenhower he interfered
in French domestic affairs in violation of
international law and without regard for
Darlan by decreeing the mobilization of
Frenchmen in North Africa; by ordering
the release of Spanish Communists; and
